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VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS
OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
EM PLOYEES
FRANK J. PELISEK*
The tax status of voluntary payments to widows of corporate offi-
cers and employees continues to be involved in considerable controversy.
In a previous article in this publication," your author ventured the
opinion that such payments would continue to be treated, for federal
tax purposes, as gifts. Such has not been the case. The decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein2 has
caused the Tax Court to do a complete about-face in its attitude toward
cases in this area and it has, since Duberstein, consistently held that
such payments constitute taxable income in the hands of the widow.
Other courts, including the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin 3 have held to the position that such payments
constitute non-taxable gifts. Before any discussion of this conflict can
profitably be undertaken, it is necessary to glance at the decision of the
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein and Stanton v. United
States,' a companion case.5
Duberstein involved the transfer of an automobile to the taxpayer
by a business associate to whom the taxpayer had furnished leads to
potential customers while Stanton involved a gratuity paid by a real
estate corporation wholly owned by Trinity Church to a resigning officer
of the corporation.
In the determination in both cases the Court specifically rejected the
Treasury's invitation to adopt a standard test in rather general terms
which it hoped could be made to apply in all subsequent gift cases. Such
test was phrased in the following terms:
Gifts should be defined as transfers of property made for
personal as distinguished from business reasons.6
Rather the Court indicated that the governing principles in the gift area
were necessarily general and that such principles had already been fully
spelled out in prior opinions. Further the Court noted that the whole
problem of the tax treatment of gratuitous transfers was one which
*Associate, Michael, Best & Friedrich, Milwaukee; L.L.B. Wisconsin, 1958.
1 Pelisek, Tax Treatment of Payments to the Widows of Corporate Officers
and Employees, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 16 (1960).
2363 U.S. 278 (1960).
3 Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
4363 U.S. 278 (1960).
5 Also decided on the same day was United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960),
which determined that union payments to strikers at the Kohler plant were
non-taxable gifts.6 Supra note 2, at 284.
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"does not lend itself to any more definitive statement that would pro-
duce a talisman for the solution of concrete cases."7 Thus the Court in
initially rejecting the "broad brush" test proposed by the Government
indicated that each gift was to stand upon its own facts and that such
facts would be applied to a series of concepts established in several
prior decisions.
Such concepts may be stated as follows:
(1) The presence of a gift within common-law concepts does not
determine the presence or absence of a gift for tax purposes since the
mere absence of a legal or moral obligation to make the transfer which
is sufficient to create a common-law gift does not establish that such
transfer is a gift for tax purposes.3
(2) If the payment proceeds primarily from the constraining force
of any moral or legal duty or from the incentive of anticipated benefit
of an economic nature such payment is not a gift.'
(3) Where the payment is in return for services rendered, it is
irrelevant that the donor receives no economic benefit from the pay-
ment.'0
(4) A gift, within the meaning of Section 102 of the Code, proceeds
from a detached and disinterested generosity" out of affection, respect,
admiration, charity or like impulses.12
(5) The most critical consideration is the intention of the donor
which controls regardless of the voluntary nature of the payment.' 3
Intention, the Court noted, is not to be viewed in the same light as
donative intent for common-law gift purposes since the donor's char-
acterization of his acts is not determinative for tax purposes. Rather
intent is to be determined by an inquiry into the basic reason for the
transferor's conduct in fact-the dominant reason that explains his
action in making the transfer. 4
The majority applied the above principles to determine, in Duber-
stein, that the Tax Court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that
the intent of the transfer of the automobile was recompense for past
services or inducement for future services. Stanton was remanded
despite a clear finding of fact as to the existence of a gift because of
the very sparseness of such finding with the resultant possibility that
the wrong legal standard had been applied. Several strong dissenting
7 Ibid.
s Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 730 (1929).
0 Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
'
0 Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952). As an example of this
general concept the Court cited the inclusion in gross income of tips.
"L Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
12 Supra note 10, at 714.
'1 Supra note 9, at 43.
'4 Supra note 2, at 286.
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opinions were filed in Stanton 5 primarily on the basis that the District
Court had already made a fully determinative finding of fact as to the
existence of a gift. On remand the trial court elaborated its findings
slightly but retained the basic determination that a gift had been in-
tended."6
How does the Dubersteign decision affect the widows' cases here
under discussion? Your author submits that Duberstein was merely a
recitation of the existing law in this area and as such should have no
substantial impact upon the prior decisions relating to payments to
widows. This is clearly the view which has been adopted in Rice v.
United States17 and similar District Court determinations 8 discussed,
infra, but which has been totally rejected by the Tax Court.
In its pre-Duerstein determinations in this area, the Tax Court con-
sistently noted that the question of whether or not a gift was present
was one of intent as determined from the facts in the specific case. This
rule has not been changed by Duberstein. Intent as shown by each par-
ticular set of facts is still controlling. What then has caused the Tax
Court to suddenly turn on the widow in favor of the Commissioner?
Little analysis is provided in any of the recent decisions to answer this
question. However, a review of the recent decisions will perhaps pro-
vide an insight into the determinations of future cases in this area and
a guide for tax planning.
The first decision of the Tax Court in this area after Duberstein
came in Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont.19 There payments were made to
the widow pursuant to a corporate resolution indicating such payments
were made "in recognition of the services rendered" by the deceased
and "as a continuation of his salary." This was typical of the language
used for many payments which had previously been held to result in
tax-free gifts. 20 The Tax Court indicated, however, that prior authority
could be disregarded in light of the Duberstein decision since there the
Supreme Court
. . . went a long way towards bringing the problem back into
proper focus, thereby clarifying and developing the law in this
troublesome area.
2 1
Although the Court designated the area as a troublesome one, it had
found little previous difficulty in consistently determining payments
15 Supra note 2, at 293.
1S Stanton v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. N.Y. 1960).
17 Supra note 3.
IsUnited States v. Kasynski, 284 F. 2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Cowan v. United
States, 191 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Frankel v. United States, 192 F.
Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961).
19 35 T.C. 65 (1960).
20 Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916, 918 (1955).
21 Supra note 19, at 68.
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similar to the one present in Pierpont to be gifts. Apparently only the
Commissioner found the area truly troublesome since he was a con-
sistent loser both in the Tax Court and elsewhere.
In sustaining the Commissioner's determination that the payments,
to the extent they exceeded $5,000, were taxable income, the Court
commented that the sole question was one of intent with the burden of
proof placed upon the taxpayer to show that the payments were in-
tended as gifts. Such intent must be shown by "solid evidence" and the
"Court is not warranted in indulging in conjectures in petitioner's favor
to fill the gap." 22 The solid evidence required which was found to be
lacking apparently consisted of evidence that the payments were moti-
vated by the needs of the widow or by a sense of generosity. Proof on
the latter point would appear difficult indeed, but proof relating to the
needs of the widow could be produced if in fact the widow were in
need. Failure of any proof of this type has been noted in all of the Tax
Court cases in this area subsequent to Pierpont. Judge Kern in a strong
dissent in Pierpont advanced the theory which has been applied by the
District Courts in urging that Duberstein involved radically different
facts from those normally involved in widows' cases and that conse-
quently it offered little aid. He further noted that if the test advanced
by the Government in Duberstein had been accepted, the tax law in this
area might have been affected, but, that since such test had been speci-
fically rejected the prior case law was controlling.
Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr.23 followed soon after Pierpont.24 There
the resolution indicated that the payment of a year's salary of the de-
ceased to his widow was "to the best interests, and benefit of the cor-
poration" and was "made as additional compensation and in considera-
tion of services heretofore rendered" to the corporation by the deceased.
Under such circumstances the Court had little difficulty in finding the
payments as compensation for past services and thus taxable to the
widow. Reed v. United States,25 a recent victory for the widow, was
noted as clearly distinguishable on its facts and also to have been de-
cided prior to Duberstein. The next Tax Court case of note in this
general area was Ivan Y. Nickerson.26 There monthly payments equal
to the deceased officer's monthly base salary made to his surviving
22 Supra note 19, at 69.
23 19 T.C.M. 1379 (1960).
24Decided immediately prior to Kuntz was Abe A. Danish, 19 T.C.M. 1349
(1960) where the Court found that payments made by an acquiring corpora-
tion to former employees of an acquired corporation were motivated by the
"constraining force of a moral or legal duty" and thus under Duberstein were
includible in gross income. The factual situation was similar to Bogardus v.
Commissioner, supra note 9, where the Supreme Court had found such pay-
ments to be gifts.
25 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd sub noin. 277 F. 2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
2619 T.C.M. 1508 (1960).
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children were held to constitute dividends. The following discussion
of the Court appears particularly instructive in regard to the required
evidence of intent:
The resolutions are devoid of any language which even remotely
suggests that the authorization of the payments proceeded from
a detached and disinterested generosity or that a reason, basic,
dominant or otherwise, for the authorization was affection, re-
spect, admiration, charity or like impulses for either the decedent
or his five children. In this connection it is observed that the
three directors who 'unanimously' adopted the resolutions of
April 3, 1954, were children of the decedent, that each received
$250 a month under the resolutions, and that the record does not
contain any suggestion that any of the five children of the dece-
dent was in need.
7
Judge Raum was the next one of the Tax Court panel to face the
issue. In both Estate of Irving Cooper,28 and Mildrew W. Smith,29
resolutions providing for payments in recognition of the services of the
deceased were held to result in taxable income to the widow. Smith is
of particular significance since there the record indicated some con-
sideration had been given by the directors to the widow's diminished
income as a result of her husband's death. However, the Court found
that no consideration had been given to her income from other sources
which in fact was substantial or to her capital resources. Thus from
the record Judge Raum concluded the payments were not based upon
need and thus gifts were rather additional compensation.
The need factor also dominates the remaining cases which have
been decided to date by the Tax Court on this issue. 30 Other factors
which have been noted include:
(1) Payments did not name widow as recipient.3 '
(2) Payments of like nature previously made by the corporation.
-3 2
(3) Treatment of the payments by the corporation as salary.3
(4) Substantial stock ownership by widow.-"
(5) Adoption of the resolution prior to the death of the officer in-
volved. 5
With the present attitude of the Tax Court toward payments of this
type perhaps the presence of any one of the above facts would be
27 Id. at 1513.
2820 T.C.M. 774 (1961).
2920 T.C.M. 775 (1961).
so Estate of W. R. Olsen, 20 T.C.M. 807 (1961) ; Estate of Julius B. Cronheim,
20 T.C.M. 1144 (1961) ; Mary Fischer, 20 T.C.M. 318 (1961) ; Estate of Rose
A. Russek, 20 T.C.M. 123 (1961); Mary C. Westphal, 37 T.C. #36 (1961)
and Roy I. Martin, 36 T.C. #56 (1961).
s1 Estate of Julius B. Cronheim, 20 T.C.M. 1144 (1961).
32Ibid.
3 Mary C. Westphal, 37 .TC. #36 (1961).
3s Estate of Rose A. Russek, 20 T.C.M. 123 (1961).
s5 Mary Fisher, 20 T.C.M. 318 (1961) ; Estate of Rose A. Russek, supra note 34.
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sufficient to defeat gift status. Certainly this would be the case if, in
addition, little or no consideration had been given to the needs of the
widow which the Tax Court indicates is of critical significance.
A completely opposite approach to that exhibited by the Tax Court
has been taken by the other Federal courts which have faced the issue.
Indicative of this is the following statement of Judge Grubb in Rice v.
United States:36
The recent decision of Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 35 T.C. 65 (1960), and cases
following its holding show a change in the tax court's interpre-
tation of the term 'gift' as used in the Internal Revenue Code.
It is the opinion of this court that Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Duberstein, supra, relied on in the Pierpont case,
reaffirms previous principles rather than proposes new rules
governing the determination whether corporate transfers con-
stituted gifts for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.
Accordingly, where, as in the instant case, there has been a
showing of donative intent and where an objective inquiry reveals
the substance of the transaction as consistent with the trans-
feror's intention, the payment in question qualifies as a gift.37
The facts in Rice indicated that the widow was not in financial need;
that the payments were "in recognition" of the services of the deceased;
that upon the previous death of another key employee like payments
had been made; and, that the corporation treated the payments as sal-
ary allowances on its own tax returns. In commenting upon the facts
the Court specifically rejected the need of the widow as a controlling
factor by stating:
Further, a charitable impulse based on the widow's need may
be one of several motivating factors in these cases. It does not
follow that corporate gifts can be made only to the impecunious
and needy.-3
In addition Judge Grubb noted that a single previous payment of this
nature did not constitute a plan or policy so as to bring the case within
the doctrine of Sinpson v. United States,9 and that the facts that the
payments were measured by the salary of the deceased and were treated
as salary by the corporation were not controlling.
Evidence strongly relied upon by the Court to support the finding
of a gift consisted of testimony by two of the corporation's directors,
(one of whom was the son of the deceased), that the payments were
prompted by a feeling of esteem for the deceased and grief at his death
and undertaken as a token of sympathy and appreciation. This is clearly
a lesser degree of proof that the "solid evidence" now required by the
36 Supra note 3.
7 Supra note 3, at 226.38 Supra note 3, at 227.
39 261 F. 2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958).
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Tax Court and shows a much clearer appreciation for the practical
problems of presentation of proof in the area of intent.
Undoubtedly under the determination in Pierpont and subsequent
Tax Court decisions the payments to Mrs. Rice would have been classed
as income if the case had been litigated in the Tax Court. The diver-
gence in result rests solely on the difference in interpretation of Duber-
stein. The Tax Court appears to accept that decision as a mandate of
the Supreme Court to abandon its long history of prior decisions in
favor of the widow, while Judge Grubb, as indicated above, interprets
Duberstein as a mere restatement of prior law including that body of
tax law supporting the widow's position. Such has also been the ap-
proach of the other Federal courts but without the very helpful elab-
oration given by Judge Grubb.4° It appears that only the determination
on appeal of either the Tax Court decisions or those of the District
Courts will remedy the existing split of authority. Several such appeals
are pending at this time and a holding of aid in solving the problem
may be forthcoming shortly. However, the split of authority on gift
status is not the only problem in this area which is unsolved.
One further problem in this area involves the effect of Section
101 (b) 41 of the 1954 Code which provides for a $5,000 exclusion from
gross income for employee death benefits. The Treasury contends, ap-
parently on the strength of dicta in two District Court cases under the
1939 Code,4 2 that all payments on account of the death of an employee
including gratuitous payments to the employee's widow are governed
by Section 101 (b) and that consequently all amounts received in excess
of $5,000 are gross income. This position has met with a unanimous
lack of success before the Courts which have had occasion to face it.
In Reed v. United States,43 the first reported case in which the issue
was raised, the Court noted that Section 102(a) of the 1954 Code con-
tains a specific provision that gross income does not include amounts
received as gifts and that nothing contained in Section 101(b) alters
the meaning of 102(a). Consequently, it determined that payments
which it found to be gifts were not subject to the $5,000 limitation.
Other courts have unanimously followed.44 The Tax Court, since it has
consistently found the payments to be taxable, has not yet been re-
quired to pass on the question. Despite universal rejection the Commis-
40 See cases cited supra note 18. See also Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp.
786 (S.D. N.Y. 1961) where the Court in denying cross-motions for summaryjudgment discussed the entire problem at some length.
41 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §101(b).
42 Bounds v. United States, 262 F. 2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1959) and Rodner v.
United States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
43 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd 277 F. 2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
"4Cowan v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 703, 705 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Frankel v.
United States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961) ; Rice v. United States, 197
F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786
(S.D. N.Y. 1961).
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sioner has not abandoned his position and has announced that the Ser-
vice will not follow the decision in Reed.45 The Service still tenaciously
clings to the position that voluntary payments to the widow of a de-
ceased employee constitute employee death benefits and are thus sub-
ject to the limitation of Section 101(b). Litigation over the question
will thus continue at least for the present.
One of the recent Tax Court decisions contains an interesting ram-
ification of the effect of Section 101(b). 46 There the widow received a
cash payment of $5,000 in addition to a lump sum distribution from
the company profit-sharing plan. In her return she treated the direct
cash payment as a gift and took the $5,000 exclusion allowed by Sec-
tion 101 (b) against the profit-sharing distribution. The Court, although
finding the cash distribution to constitute income, allowed the widow
to apply the exclusion of Section 101(b) against such amount leaving
the lump sum distribution from the plan wholly taxable but at the more
favorable capital gain rates.4 7
A further problem in this area relates to the deductibility of the
payment by the corporation. In the recent Cooper" case the Tax Court
specifically held that the amounts paid to the widow, which it had found
to constitute additional compensation, were deductible by the corpora-
tion. This determination was in accord with other recent authority.49
However, in two other recent Tax Court decisions deductibility has
been denied. In Harry L. Davis Co.Y9 the company treated the payments
on its books as salary earned by the widow. The Court denied the deduc-
tion because of a failure by the company to show any active participation
by the widow in the running of its affairs. Payments in prior years
which had been classified as gifts to the widow had previously been
challenged by the Service but the controversy had been settled by the
disallowance of a deduction for such payments for one of the three
years involved. In subsequent years the taxpayer attempted to sustain
the deduction on the basis of salary earned or in the alternative as a
salary continuation for the widow. The Court determined that since
.the primary position of salary earned could not be sustained the tax-
payer was not free to rely on the payments as salary continuation al-
though it recognized that in proper cases a deduction would be allowed
for such payments.
In Barbourville Brick Company5' payments were made to a widow
who owned either directly or in a fiduciary capacity 168 out of 180
45 Rev. Rul. 60-236, 1960-2 Cum. Bul. 32.
46 Estate of W. R. Olsen, 20 T.C.M. 807 (1961).41 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 402(a) (2).
48 Estate of Irving Cooper, 20 T.C.M. 774 (1961).
49 See Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 31 T.C. 1080 (1959) and Champion Spark
Plug Company, 30 T.C. 295 (1958), aff'd 266 F. 2d 347 (6th Cir. 1959).
50 T.C. Memo 1961-209.5137 T.C. #2 (1961).
1961-62]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
shares of the company's outstanding stock. Under such circumstances
the Court held the payments to constitute non-deductible dividends al-
though the resolution was worded to indicate that the payments were
to constitute a gratuity to the widow.
On the deductibility question note should be made of the fact that
in Rice52 the corporation had deducted the payments as "salary allow-
ances" or "widow's allowance". The Court found this fact as not con-
trolling. Such reasoning is in complete accord with Duberstein where
the Court stated:
• . . it is doubtless relevant to the over-all inference that the
transferor treats a payment as a business deduction, or that the
transferor is a corporate entity. But these inferences cannot be
stated in absolute terms. Neither factor is a shibboleth. The tax-
ing statute does not make nondeductibility by the transferor a
condition on the 'gift' exclusion; nor does it draw any distinction,
in terms, between transfers by corporations and individuals, as
to the availability of the 'gift' exclusion to the transferee. The
conclusion whether a transfer amounts to a 'gift' is one that must
be reached on consideration of all the factors. 53
Many of the earlier decided cases sustaining gift treatment for the
widow were similar to Rice in that they involved situations where a
business deduction had already been allowed to the corporation either
as salary or as a widow's allowance. Upon the subsequent finding of
gift status of the payments in the hands of the widow, the Service had
lost both ways. To avoid this problem the Service has now begun to
disallow the deduction to the corporation and at the same time to treat
the payments as income to the widow. This inconsistent treatment
places the corporation and the widow at opposite ends of the question
and forces them to, in effect, fight each other while the Service sits
back and waits. Since the corporation is often at a higher bracket and
consequently the disallowance of the deduction means more in tax
dollars than the inclusion of the payment in the widow's income it nor-
mally will be the widow who will be forced to concede. To sustain her
position she needs the complete support of the corporation management
which authorized the payment, and if the corporation is forced to place
its own deduction of the payments in jeopardy by such support, it will,
in most instances, probably not be forthcoming. This tactic by the Ser-
vice will undoubtedly reduce the amount of litigation in this area but
it clearly will not completely halt the controversy as long as the widow
has the friendly forum afforded by the District Courts available to her.54
52 Supra note 3.
53 Supra note 2, at 287.
5' Of interest to Wisconsin practitioners is the present peculiar situation of
widows' payments here. The Service insists that such payments be treated as
income for federal tax purposes while the Wisconsin Department of Taxation
insists that they be treated as gifts, for state purposes with the resultant im-
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In summary it appears that the controversy over the treatment of
gratuitous payments to widows of corporate officers and employees
will continue until either the Supreme Court settles the issue or the
Treasury seeks and obtains legislative action. At present the widow is
meeting with a unanimous lack of success before the Tax Court. She
must therefore pay her asserted deficiency and seek refund in the
friendlier confines of the District Courts.
position of gift tax at the maximum basic rate levied by Wis. STAT. §72.77(4)(1959) and non-deductibility to the corporation. See Spangler v. Department
of Taxation, 255 Wis. 51, 37 N.W. 2d 857 (1949).
1961-62]
